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We describe a new anomaly in intertemporal choice—the “date/delay effect”: discount rates that areimputed when time is described using calendar dates (e.g., on October 17) are markedly lower than those
revealed when future outcomes are described in terms of the corresponding delay (e.g., in six months). Date
descriptions not only reduce discount rates, but also affect the implied shape of the discount function: When
inferred from intertemporal choices between options referenced by calendar dates, the discount function appears
markedly less hyperbolic. We discuss potential psychological bases of the date/delay effect, its implications,
and other modes of temporal reference.
Key words : intertemporal choice; framing effects; decision making
History : Accepted by Detlof von Winterfeldt, decision analysis; received April 5, 2004. This paper was with
the authors 2 12 months for 1 revision.
Introduction
In his Gettysburg Address, Abraham Lincoln used the
powerful phrase “Four score and seven years ago” to
refer to the time that had elapsed since the found-
ing of his nation. It is unlikely that Lincoln chose this
phrase casually, or that he would have been equally
satisﬁed with “about 90 years ago,” or “in 1776.” He
knew that the effect of his speech depended as much
on the words he chose as on what they referred to.1
In a more mundane context, experimenters investi-
gating intertemporal choice must also decide how to
describe time to their respondents. To illustrate, we
may want to know the present value that someone
places on £100 to be received in 18 months. We can
refer to that temporal interval using different units
1 If not Lincoln then perhaps his public relations advisor, a role
adopted by Bob Newhart in one of his monologues:
You changed four score and seven to    to 87?!   but, Abe,
that’s meant to be a grabber. Abe, we test marketed that in
Erie and they went out of their minds. Trust me, [if we use
“87”] it’s sort of like Marc Antony saying, “Friends, Romans,
Countrymen, I’ve got something I wanna tell ya!” See what I
mean, Abe?
of delay (e.g., 550 days, 1.5 years), combinations of
these units (e.g., one year and six months), or calendar
dates (e.g., on July 5, 2006). Even a casual reading of
the literature will reveal that different experimenters
choose different descriptions and that they rarely if
ever speculate about the implications of their choices.
This implies a belief that the way time is described
does not matter.
This assumption is inconsistent with the wealth
of evidence demonstrating “framing” effects in other
contexts. For example, identical outcomes lead to risk
seeking when they are described as losses relative to
an arbitrary reference point, and risk aversion when
they are described as gains (Kahneman and Tversky
1983); the decision weight placed on unitary quan-
tities (such as probability and time) increases when
they are decomposed into formally identical sub-
sidiary components (Read 2001, Starmer and Sugden
1993); and choices between gambles can even be inﬂu-
enced by whether the payoffs are listed in columns or
rows (Harless 1992). These ﬁndings show that we can-
not assume the impact of temporal distance is inde-
pendent of how time is described.
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In this paper, we focus explicitly on the effect of
describing time using calendar dates versus units of
delay. We were inspired by a passage from Robert
Strotz’s (1955) seminal paper on intertemporal choice:
The relative weight which a person may assign to the
satisfaction of a future act of consumption (the man-
ner of discounting) may depend on either or both
of two things: (1) the time distance of the future date
from the present moment [what we call the delay], or
(2) the calendar date of the future act of consumption.
(pp. 167–168)
This passage summarises a general model of time dis-
counting in which the present value of a delayed out-
come is the product of two factors: its future value
(the value it will have when it is received), and the
discount factor (the weight currently accorded to this
future value, which generally diminishes as function
of delay).
The passage also lends itself to an additional inter-
pretation. It points out that there are two ways to
describe the moments at which outcomes will occur:
as a delay from the present, or as a speciﬁc point in
time identiﬁed by a calendar date. It also suggests to
us that these descriptions correspond to different psy-
chological processes. Strotz may have considered this
possibility, as the above passage continues:
To the extent that time-distance is important, I may
assign a different (and probably higher) weight to
September 26 as it draws nigh; if only the calendar
date is important, the weight will not change as that
date approaches. (p. 168)
One interpretation of this passage is that the degree
to which future outcomes are discounted may depend
on whether we direct our attention primarily toward
the delay (time-distance) or the date (the future
moment when the outcome occurs), and that we will
discount more if we focus on the delay than on
the date.
Following Strotz’s suggestions, we propose the
date/delay hypothesis—that the valuation of a future
outcome will depend on whether its timing is
described in terms of delays or calendar dates. Specif-
ically, using units of delay will draw our attention to
how long we will wait, whereas using calendar dates
will draw it to the moment the outcome will occur,
and on the value it will have at that time. Therefore,
people will be more patient (they will discount less)
when time is described as a calendar date than when
it is described in terms of units of delay.
In this paper, we describe ﬁve tests of the date/
delay effect and demonstrate that it is a replicable
and robust phenomenon. Experiments 1 and 2 show
the date/delay effect for two elicitation procedures
widely used in studies of decision making—choice
and matching. Experiment 3 demonstrates that the
date/delay effect occurs even when real money is
at stake. Experiment 4 investigates what happens
when both descriptions are presented concurrently
and reveals that the delay description appears to take
precedence. Finally, Experiment 5 highlights another
important difference between the two possible frames:
Hyperbolic discounting occurs for delay, but not date,
descriptions. In our discussion, we consider possible
causes for the date/delay effect, and sketch out some
of its implications.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, participants chose between smaller-
sooner SS and larger-later LL options. The inter-
val separating the outcomes was identical though it
was described in different ways, using either calendar
Dates, or Delays (a number of Months or Weeks).2
Method
Ninety students from the London School of Eco-
nomics were approached in the courtyard or library,
randomly assigned to the Date, Month, or Week con-
ditions, and checked the box of the option they pre-
ferred in four questions of the following type:
Option 1 Option 2
You receive £370 £450
When September 26, 2003 June 25, 2004
Your choice  
Half answered the four questions in the order given in
Table 1, and half answered them in the reverse order.
Four incomplete questionnaires were excluded from
the analysis.
Analyses
The dependent measure was the number of times
each participant chose the larger-later reward LL. As
Table 2 shows, there was a strong date/delay effect:
Twice as many people chose LL in the Date condition
than in the Week or Month conditions. Differences
across conditions were tested formally with Kruskal-
Wallis tests. An overall test conﬁrmed a signiﬁ-
cant difference between the conditions (22 = 211,
2 The dates in this experiment, and in all subsequent ones, were
chosen to ensure that our test of the date/delay hypothesis was
conservative. Experiment 1 was conducted during the ﬁrst weeks
in June 2003, which meant that each date-interval began and ended
approximately two weeks earlier than the delay-interval. If one
assumes exponential discounting, this should make no difference
because the discount rate is constant across time. If one assumes
hyperbolic discounting, this procedure is conservative, because a
hyperbolic discount function predicts greater discounting for events
that are closer in time, and would therefore predict more choices
of SS in the Date condition—the opposite of the date/delay effect.
IN
F
O
R
M
S
ho
ld
s
co
p
yr
ig
h
t
to
th
is
ar
tic
le
an
d
di
st
rib
ut
ed
th
is
co
py
as
a
co
ur
te
sy
to
th
e
au
th
or
(s
).
A
dd
iti
on
al
in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
in
cl
ud
in
g
rig
ht
s
an
d
pe
rm
is
si
on
po
lic
ie
s,
is
av
ai
la
bl
e
at
ht
tp
s:
//w
w
w
.in
fo
rm
s.
or
g/
.
Read, Frederick, Orsel, and Rahman: The Date/Delay Effect in Temporal Discounting
1328 Management Science 51(9), pp. 1326–1335, © 2005 INFORMS
Table 1 Amounts and Times Used as Stimuli in Experiments 1–4
A B C D
Question: SS LL SS LL SS LL SS LL
Experiment 1
Amount £370 £450 £520 £740 £770 £1,480 £900 £1,200
Date Sept 26, 2003 June 25, 2004 July 25, 2003 Nov 26, 2004 Nov 28, 2003 May 26, 2006 Aug 29, 2003 Sept 24, 2004
Delay (months) 4 13 2 18 6 36 3 16
Delay (weeks) 17 56 9 78 26 156 13 65
Experiment 2
Amount £370 £450 £520 £740 £770 £1,480 £900 £1,200
Date Oct 31, 2003 July 7, 2004 Aug 29, 2003 Dec 31, 2004 Dec 26, 2003 June 30, 2006 Sept 26, 2003 Oct 29, 2004
Delay (months) 4 13 2 18 6 36 3 16
Experiment 3
Amount £37 £46 £52 £82 £77 £128 £90 £138
Date Mar 25, 2005 Dec 30, 2005 Jan 28, 2005 May 26, 2006 May 27, 2005 Oct 27, 2006 Feb 25, 2005 Mar 24, 2006
Delay (months) 4 13 2 18 6 23 3 16
Experiment 4
Amount £900 £1,200 £750 £2,000 £520 £780 £465 £870
Date Feb 27, 2004 June 24, 2005 April 30, 2004 Oct 31, 2008 Dec 26, 2003 Oct 28, 2005 Mar 26, 2004 Feb 23, 2007
Delay (months) 4 20 6 60 2 24 5 40
p < 00001). Separate tests conﬁrmed that the Date
condition differed signiﬁcantly from both the Month
21 = 117	 p = 0001 and Week (21= 177,
p < 00001) conditions, while the Month and Week
conditions did not differ from each other 21= 12	
p= 0273.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, preferences were elicited using
choice. In Experiment 2 we tested whether the
date/delay effect is robust with respect to response
mode, by observing whether it occurs for matching
as well as choice. In matching the respondent pro-
vides a missing attribute value that will make two
options subjectively equivalent, as in the following
(where tLL is the time at which the larger-later out-
come xLL will be received, and tSS is the time when
the smaller-sooner outcome xSS will be received):
• $370 in 17 weeks is equal to $450 in ___ weeks
(matching on tLL)
Table 2 Experiment 1
Description
Date Delay (months) Delay (weeks)
A (%) 60 29 14
B (%) 63 18 7
C (%) 60 43 32
D (%) 53 18 21
Mean (%) 59 27 19
N 30 28 28
Note. Percent choices of the larger-later LL amount
given different descriptions of time.
• $370 in ___ weeks is equal to $450 in 56 weeks
(matching on tSS)
• $370 in 17 weeks is equal to $___ in 56 weeks
(matching on xLL)
• $___ in 17 weeks is equal to $450 in 56 weeks
(matching on xSS)
Method
Participants included students from the London
School of Economics (LSE) and visitors to a local busi-
ness centre (Canary Wharf); 160 completed the ques-
tionnaire. As described above, subjects equated pairs
of delayed outcomes by ﬁlling in a missing attribute
value. For half of the participants, time was referred
to as a calendar date, and for half it was referred to
as a delay in months. Respondents were ﬁrst shown
the following practice question:
Option 1 Option 2
You receive £ ___A___ £500
When August 10, 2003 November 24, 2003
They were then told “we want you to ﬁll in the blank
to make both options equal to you. In the example
above you should state what value for A would make
getting A on August 10, 2003, just as good as get-
ting £500 on November 24, 2003.”
After answering this practice question, each par-
ticipant made a matching response to four different
questions (as described in Table 1), with a different
attribute left blank for each question (i.e., each
respondent matched once on tLL, tSS , xLL, and xSS).
Thirty-two forms were constructed by crossing two
time descriptions (Date versus Delay) with the four
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attributes left blank (tLL, tSS , xLL, and xSS), and with
four question orders (ABCD, BCDA, CDAB, or
DABC). For each question order, there were four
groups based on which attribute was blank for which
question. These are shown below. If a participant was
in Group I, for instance, they ﬁlled in the xLL blank
for question A, the tLL blank for question B and so
on. Each of the four groups was divided into the four
orders, yielding 16 forms in all. And each of these
16 forms were constructed twice, once for the date
and once for the delay condition.
A B C D
I xLL tLL xSS tSS
II tLL xSS tSS xLL
III xSS tSS xLL tLL
IV tSS xLL tLL xSS
Analysis
The dependent measure is the choice implied by each
response if it had been a choice between an item
with all the values from Table 1 ﬁlled in (for a dis-
cussion of choice versus implied choice, see Tversky
et al. 1988). To illustrate, suppose that xLL was miss-
ing in question A and the respondent ﬁlled in a value
of £470. Indifference between £370 on October 31, 2003,
and £470 on July 7, 2004, implies a preference for £370
on October 31, 2003, over £450 on July 7, 2004 (the
values from Table 1).
Table 3 reports the percentage of participants who
made implicit choices of LL, broken down either by
question (A, B, C, D) or matching attribute (tLL, tSS ,
xLL, xSS). There was a clear date/delay effect, with
more implicit choices of LL in the Date than in the
Delay condition. We ﬁrst tested this with a Kruskal-
Wallis test comparing the total implied choices of LL
Table 3 Experiment 2
Date (%) Delay (%)
Broken down by question
A 37 29
B 44 18
C 51 23
D 58 26
Broken down by response type
tSS 47 32
tLL 33 15
xSS 59 29
xLL 51 19
Mean 48 24
Note. “Implied” choice—proportion of respondents
whose matching responses implied a choice of larger-
later LL if all cells had been ﬁlled in with values from
Table 1.
in the Date and Delay conditions 21 = 178	 p <
00001. Separate 2 analyses for each attribute con-
ﬁrmed the robustness of this result. There were more
choices of LL when matching on tLL 21= 67	 p=
001, xSS 21 = 138	 p < 00001, and xLL 21 =
168	 p < 00001, and tSS 21= 38	 p= 005. Thus,
the date/delay effect is found for matching as well as
choice.
Experiment 3
The choices respondents made in Experiments 1 and 2
were hypothetical. Although there is no evidence that
hypothetical and real rewards are discounted differ-
ently (Frederick et al. 2003, Johnson and Bickel 2002),
we conducted a modiﬁed version of Experiment 1
that included a random lottery incentive (e.g., Starmer
and Sugden 1991) to ensure that the date/delay effect
from Experiment 1 could not be attributed to respon-
dents’ failure to consider their options carefully. Sixty
respondents, all LSE students recruited at the univer-
sity library, answered four questions of the type asked
in the previous experiment (see Table 1).
After completing a sample question, respondents
were informed that two participants would be
selected and paid according to their choices:
Two participants will receive one of their choices for
real. They will receive a bank transfer for the cho-
sen amount at the speciﬁed time. For instance, if
your name was chosen for the above choice, and you
chose Option 1, you would receive £40 on July 29,
2005 [in seven months in the delay condition], while
if you chose Option 2, you would receive £55 on
September 30, 2006 [in 22 months in the Delay
condition].
Your email address: ___ (so we can contact you if you
are chosen to receive a payment)
As Table 4 reveals, even when real money was at
stake, the date/delay effect was substantial. Respon-
dents chose the LL option far more often when
time was referred to using calendar dates—a dif-
ference that was highly signiﬁcant according to a
Kruskal-Wallis test 21= 191	 p < 00001.
Table 4 Experiment 3
Description
Question Date Delay
A (%) 42 10
B (%) 58 17
C (%) 81 30
D (%) 81 30
Mean (%) 65 22
N 30 29
Note. Percent choosing the larger-later LL amount given
different descriptions of time.
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Table 5 Experiment 4
Description
Question Date Date+Delay Delay
A (%) 47 23 18
B (%) 50 33 25
C (%) 33 13 21
D (%) 30 13 11
Mean (%) 40 21 19
N 28 30 30
Note. Percent choosing the larger-later LL amount given
different descriptions of time.
Experiment 4
Experiments 1 through 3 demonstrated that the
date/delay effect was robust under two different
response modes and that it persisted in choices with
monetary incentives. In Experiment 4, we investi-
gated what happens when both time descriptions
are available simultaneously by comparing the Date
and Delay conditions with a combined Date+Delay
condition. We were interested in whether one time
description would dominate or whether both would
contribute to an impression of temporal distance, such
that the choices in the Date+Delay condition would
be between those in the separate Date and Delay
conditions.
Method
Participants were 90 students from the LSE who were
approached in the courtyard or library and asked to
complete our questionnaire. They chose between pairs
of outcomes in which the times were described as
either Dates, Delays (in months), or as both (Date+
Delay). The rewards were identical to those in Exper-
iment 1, though the times differed (see Table 1). The
format of the Date+Delay condition is shown below:
Option 1 Option 2
You receive £900 £1,200
When in 4 months in 20 months
February 27, 2004 June 24, 2003
Your choice  
The Date and Delay questions were exactly like those
used in Experiments 1 and 3.
As before, participants chose LL far more frequently
in the Date than the Delay condition, with the Date+
Delay condition in between but much closer to the
Delay condition (see Table 5). Kruskal-Wallis tests
revealed a signiﬁcant overall effect 22= 854	 p =
0014 and signiﬁcant differences between the Date
condition and Delay condition 21= 67	 p = 001
and between the Date condition and the Date+Delay
condition 21 = 56	 p = 0018, but no difference
between the Delay condition and Date+Delay con-
dition 21= 0086	 p= 0769. It appears that when
both descriptions are presented concurrently, people
choose as if they had seen the Delay description only.
Experiment 5
Hyperbolic discounting refers to the hypothesis or
observation that discount rates decrease as outcomes
recede into the further future. This means that the
rate at which the present value of a reward declines
as it is delayed from t to t + 1 is decreasing in t.
Hyperbolic discounting predicts that for any pair of
rewards separated by a ﬁxed interval (i.e., holding
the time separating tSS and tLL constant), delaying the
onset of that interval tSS will increase the likelihood
of choosing LL. In most tests of this prediction, time
has been described as a delay and usually the pre-
diction of hyperbolic discounting has been conﬁrmed
(e.g., Bleichrodt and Johannesson 2001; Kirby and
Herrnstein 1995; Read and Roelofsma 2003, Exper-
iment 1; Keren and Roelofsma 1995; Van der Pol
and Cairns 2002—though see Ahlbrecht and Weber
1997; Baron 2000; Holcomb and Nelson 1992; Read
2001, Experiment 2).3 On the other hand, in the few
experiments describing time in terms of calendar
dates, hyperbolic discounting has not been observed
(Pender 1996; Read 2001; Read and Roelofsma 2003,
Experiment 2). Thus, the existing literature sug-
gests that hyperbolic discounting may occur only (or,
at least, primarily) when time is described as a delay.
However, the hypothesis has never been tested within
a single study that compares date and delay descrip-
tions, so it is unclear whether the differences between
studies are due to time description, or to other dif-
ferences between the methods used. To answer this
question, we conducted Experiment 5.
Method
The experiment used a computerized choice titration
method described in earlier papers (Read 2001, Read
and Roelofsma 2003). Participants chose between
delayed outcomes presented on a computer screen as
below:
Amount £500 £1,000
When received November 29, 2002 February 28, 2003
They indicated their preferred outcome by depressing
one of two keys. Following the choice, either xLL or xSS
was adjusted to bring the options closer together. For
example, if £1,000 was chosen in the question above,
the value of xSS may be increased to £750 and the
3 This list excludes many studies that failed to hold interval length
constant.
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Table 6 Experiment 5
Interval endpoint
Interval length Description N t1 t2 t3 t4 t5
Short Date 20 August 30, 2002 November 29, 2002 February 28, 2003 May 30, 2003 August 29, 2003
Delay 29 in 1 month in 4 months in 7 months in 10 months in 13 months
Long Date 19 October 25, 2002 August 29, 2003 April 30, 2004 January 28, 2005 October 28, 2005
Delay 21 in 3 months in 12 months in 21 months in 30 months in 39 months
Note. Interval endpoints for all conditions. Interval 1 is from t1 → t2, interval 2 from t2 → t3, and so on.
respondent would choose again. This process was
continued until an indifference point was reached—
where xSS at tSS was equal in subjective value to xLL
at tLL.
At the indifference point, the relationship between
SS and LL can be expressed as xSS = tLL−tSS xLL, where
 is a discount factor that indexes the average value of
1 unit of value if it is delayed by 1 unit of time (years,
in our study). Rearranging these terms, we derive the
discount factor, our dependent variable, as follows:
= xSS/xLL1/tLL−tSS 
Participants were 89 students and staff from LSE.
They were divided into four groups based on whether
time was described as a Date or Delay, and on whether
the discounting intervals were Long or Short. The
stimuli are summarized in Table 6. Four discounting
intervals were chosen that spanned either a 12-month
(Short) or 36-month (Long) period. For example, in
the Short condition, Interval 1 spanned the dates from
August 30, 2002, to November 29, 2002 (1 month
to 4 months), Interval 2 spanned the dates from
November 29, 2002, to February 28, 2003 (4 months to
7 months), and so on. The four intervals appeared to
respondents in random order, embedded in a series of
other similar questions.4
Results
The mean values of  are depicted in Figure 1. As
can be seen, there was a strong date/delay effect, with
 consistently higher when time was referred to as a
date than when it was referred to as a delay F 1	85=
99	 p < 0002. Moreover, there was strong evidence
of hyperbolic discounting in the delay, but not the
date condition: Within-subject contrasts revealed a
strong linear trend in the delay condition F 1	48 =
3443	 p < 00001, but no linear trend in the date con-
dition F 1	37= 013.
4 These data are excerpted from a much larger study with many
conditions, designed as a follow-up to Read (2001). We report
a subset of these conditions to simplify exposition. What we
report here, however, is consistent with every condition in the
study. In particular, there was a strong date-delay effect in every
comparison.
Consistent with our hypothesis, hyperbolic dis-
counting is only observed when time is described in
delay terms.5 This demonstrates the important role
that temporal description plays in determining the
shape of the discount function.
Discussion
This paper provides evidence for a date/delay effect
in intertemporal choice: People exhibit less discount-
ing when time intervals are described as dates than
when they are described as delays. Like other fram-
ing effects, the date/delay effect shows that when
people encounter a speciﬁc problem description, they
do not automatically translate it into a canonical rep-
resentation that is shared by all formally identical
descriptions. Rather, they appear to adopt the perspec-
tive they are presented with—and all its psychological
concomitants—for whatever choice and judgment is
at hand. That this occurs for dates and delays is par-
ticularly striking because these two temporal frames
are extremely familiar and our respondents will have
been repeatedly and recently exposed to both types of
descriptions (e.g., “Let’s meet next week, same time”
or “No I have a meeting then, but I’m free on the 23rd
and the 25th”).6 But experience with both descriptions
does not mean that one description is effortlessly tran-
formed into the other, or that the necessary effort will
always be expended (unless some calculation, such
as an interest payment, requires it). Indeed, the expe-
rience and familiarity with both frames may inhibit
5 The term “hyperbolic discounting” is sometimes used to refer to
quasi-hyperbolic discounting or present-biased preferences, which
is the disposition to overvalue immediate outcomes relative to
delayed ones (Laibson 1998, O’Donoghue and Rabin 2001). Because
all outcomes in Study 5 were delayed by at least a month, it cannot
be considered a test of this version of hyperbolic discounting.
6 In this respect, the date/delay effect appears even more strik-
ing than many other framing effects because people rarely have a
comparable opportunity to recognize the correspondence between
frames. For example, though experimenters can describe formally
equivalent gambles in different ways by partitioning an event into
its mutually exclusive components, it would be rare for a gambler
at the roulette wheel to think of his bet on “red” as a bet on the
union of the 18 red numbers {2, 27, etc.}, each of which has a
probability 1/38 of occurring.
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Figure 1 Experiment 5
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Short intervals Long intervals
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Notes. Values of  measured for intervals of the same length but varying in onset, under both date and delay descriptions. Interval 1 ranges from t1 → t2,
interval 2 from t2 → t3, and so on.
motivation to transform one into the other. Respon-
dents are not like Americans landing in England who
must do a calculation to decide what to wear at 20 Cel-
sius. Rather, whether given a date or delay frame, they
likely have some intuitive impression of how long the
period in question is and can make the required judg-
ment or choice without feeling any need to consult
an alternate temporal metric. What is interesting, of
course, is that the intuitive impressions of temporal
length associated with the two descriptions may differ.
Although the existence of a date/delay effect is
clear, we have not isolated its psychological bases. In
the next section, we consider several possible explana-
tions and discuss the degree to which each is consis-
tent with our experimental data. While none of these
hypotheses can neatly account for all our ﬁndings,
all of them correspond to plausible psychological pro-
cesses and indeed may all play a role in producing the
date/delay effect.
What Is Responsible for the Date/Delay Effect?
Our starting point, based on our reading of Strotz
(1955), could be called the attention-focusing hypothe-
sis. According to this account, temporal framing inﬂu-
ences the attention allocated to the value versus the
timing of a future outcome, with value receiving rel-
atively more attention under the date than under the
delay description. Correspondingly, to the extent that
outcome value is emphasized, larger rewards will
be more preferred despite being received later. This
attention-focusing hypothesis is consistent with the
basic date/delay effect as found in our choice studies
whereby the attractiveness of LL increased in the date
frame (Experiments 1, 3, and 4).
A second explanation is the choice strategy hypoth-
esis, whereby different temporal frames facilitate or
impede different decision strategies. The delay condi-
tion may encourage a compensatory strategy because
delays and amounts are both continuous numeric vari-
ables, denominated in integers, which may encour-
age respondents to establish some exchange rate to
guide their evaluation of, and choice between, out-
comes. However, the date description impedes such a
process. Participants must either transform dates into
corresponding delays or adopt a noncompensatory
decision strategy, such as always choosing the option
that is better on the more important attribute (e.g.,
Slovic 1975, Payne et al. 1993). If amount is the “more
important” attribute—the one to which respondents
are likely to defer when deciding between options
that differ on both dimensions—it would explain
the preponderance of LL choices in the date condi-
tions. This hypothesis is consistent with the choice
data from Experiments 1, 3, and 4. However, as with
the attention-focusing hypothesis, the choice strategy
hypothesis cannot account for the persistence of the
date/delay effect in the matching task, which effec-
tively forbids the application of a lexicographic strat-
egy (see Tversky et al. 1988, Frederick and Shaﬁr 2005).
A third explanation, the preference for precision
hypothesis, is that people prefer the precision of a date
to the vagueness of a delay, and so are more patient
over a dated interval because they are more certain
that the larger-later reward will actually be received.
There will certainly be circumstances when dates do
make us more secure than delays. For instance, the
promise that we will be paid “on August 3” likely
inspires more conﬁdence than the promise that we will
be paid “in two months.”
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Again, while this could partly explain the phe-
nomenon, it falls short of being sufﬁcient. First, the
arguably more ambiguous temporal referents in the
delay condition apply to both future outcomes (SS
and LL). Thus, if both outcomes are discounted by
some additional constant factor (e.g., “Unless they
give me a date, I’m only 80% certain I’ll get it
at all”), it would not shift preference in favor of the
smaller-sooner uncertain reward.7 Second, although
Months is clearly a less precise temporal description
than Weeks, the larger delayed reward LL was cho-
sen more frequently in the Month condition in Experi-
ment 1. Finally, in the Date+Delay condition of Exper-
iment 4, which does specify a future date, people were
just as impatient as in a delay-only condition. It seems
unlikely that people believe that “in six months, on
July 3, 2005,” is a less deﬁnite promise than “on July 3,
2005.”
A fourth account is the differential time estimation
hypothesis which posits that relative to the delay inter-
val, the date framing causes the temporal interval to be
underestimated. We do not merely mean that it dimin-
ishes the impact of temporal distance—that is the phe-
nomenon for which an explanation is being sought—
but that people actually underestimate the temporal
separation in terms of some other metric (e.g., they
don’t realize that the time between the “end of August”
and the “beginning of December” spans 13 weeks).
This hypothesis can account for the results of Exper-
iments 1, 3, and 4. Moreover, unlike the ﬁrst two
hypotheses, it can account for the matching results of
Experiment 2 because perceived delay should affect all
of the matching responses regardless of whether time
or amount is the response variable.
A ﬁfth hypothesis, related to the differential time
estimation hypothesis, is the similarity hypothesis
based on recent work by Rubinstein (2003) and Leland
(2002). They argue that discounting diminishes as a
function of the judged similarity of the time-points
marking the beginning and the end of an interval.
According to this account, the date/delay effect occurs
because two dates seem more similar than two delays
spanning the same time period. For example, in ques-
tion D from Experiment 1, respondents evaluated two
delayed options framed either as 3 months versus
16 months, or as August 29, 2003, versus September 24,
2004. By any metric of similarity, 3 and 16 months
seem pretty different, perhaps because the ratio of the
two time periods (which exceeds 5:1) is so salient.
Thus, we should expect (and we observe) high dis-
counting (low values of ). Conversely, the corre-
sponding dates do not seem so different: 29 is simi-
lar to 24, 2003 is similar to 2004, and August is adja-
cent to September in the calendar. Rubinstein argues
7 One might, however, posit that people apply higher discount
rates whenever the future is referred to in more ambiguous terms.
that hyperbolic discounting occurs because the simi-
larity between two time-points separated by a com-
mon interval increases with the onset of that interval:
12 months is more similar to 11 months than 2 months
is to 1 month. Similarly, Prelec and Loewenstein (1991)
suggest that similarity between two numbers depends
on both differences and ratios, and that discount rates
decrease with time because the ratio of two delays
sharing a common difference diminishes when a con-
stant delay is added to both. Our data are consis-
tent with such accounts because a similar logic does
not apply to dates: The similarity between dates sep-
arated by a common interval does not change with
onset time, e.g., the similarity of August 13, 2005, and
September 22, 2005, is no greater than the similarity of
August 13, 2004, to September 22, 2004. Thus, we have
hyperbolic discounting for delays but not for dates.
The last two hypotheses not only predict differences
in the degree to which future rewards are valued (the
focus of our experiments, and indeed nearly all exper-
iments on discounting); they also imply that temporal
framing will affect all sorts of temporal judgments that
have nothing to do with valuation. As a casual “test”
of this, we told a group of MIT students on December 8
that a baby boy who is 12 weeks old today currently
weighs 13 pounds. We then asked them to guess how
much that baby boy would weigh at a future time,
manipulating how the future time was described. In
the delay group, we framed it as “when he is 36 weeks
old” whereas in the date group we framed it as “on
May 5.” To the extent that the future date seems more
similar (or closer) to the present in the date frame, the
baby should be perceived to have less time to grow
and, thus, should be judged to be smaller at the spec-
iﬁed future time. That is, indeed, what we observed:
Respondents in the Date group estimated that the
baby would attain a weight of “only” 24.7 pounds,
compared to those in the Delay group who thought
he would weigh 29.3 pounds, t59 = 2013; p < 005.
(Both of these are overestimates; the actual expected
weight is roughly 21 pounds.)
The baby data illustrate and foreshadow the difﬁ-
culty of precisely specifying the underlying psychol-
ogy of the date/delay effect. Though the data could be
cited in support of either the differential time estimation
hypothesis or the similarity hypothesis, if similarity
refers to temporal distance, it is unclear whether one
can distinguish the hypothesis that the baby is judged
to be smaller in the delay frame because the future
date seems more “similar” from the hypothesis that
he is judged to be smaller because the time interval is
seen as being objectively shorter.8 Moreover, the baby
8 Moreover, estimates of time can only be made in terms of some
other metric of time. Thus, it is difﬁcult to test whether time is
underestimated when described as dates relative to delays, without
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data are also consistent with the choice strategy hypoth-
esis. In the delay condition, respondents may reason
that since 36 weeks is 3 times as long as 12 weeks, the
baby may be 3 times bigger by then (39 pounds). Even
if they reject this computation, it may act as an anchor
for their ultimate response. Again, however, it is difﬁ-
cult to determine whether someone in the delay condi-
tion who gave a response such as “31 pounds” did so
because they insufﬁciently adjusted from the 39 pound
anchor, because 36 weeks and 12 weeks sound “dis-
similar,” or because the corresponding dates sound
less than 24 weeks apart. We leave the resolution of
these questions to future research. Our primary goal
in this paper was to document the date/delay effect
(which we did in Experiments 1 through 5), to spec-
ulate about its causes (which we have just done), and
to sketch out some of its implications (which we do
next).
Implications
The date/delay effect has practical implications. One
lesson is that commercial retailers should refer to
future outcomes in terms of calendar dates if they
want to discourage discounting (e.g., if the buyer must
incur unavoidable long shipping delays), but in terms
of delays when they want to encourage it (e.g., when
the seller makes money from express shipping). The
implications may be greatest in the domain of invest-
ment and credit offerings. When people think of the
future in terms of calendar dates, they will be more
likely to invest and less likely to borrow, because there
will be less discounting over the time that elapses
before future returns will be received or future pay-
ments demanded. For instance, when offering bonds,
Euro bills, Treasury bills, and other ﬁxed-term securi-
ties, it would be better to emphasize the speciﬁc listed
calendar date on which they mature, as this should
reduce discounting and increase willingness to invest
at a given rate. Conversely, it may be best to offer
loans by referring to the delay until the loan comes
due, as this should make future payments seem more
distant and therefore less onerous. In fact, bonds and
loans are advertised this way, although we doubt this
is a strategic decision.9 Another implication is that
directly confronting respondents with an equivalence judgment
that effectively guarantees the detection of the identity of the two
descriptions. That is, if respondents are asked, “How many weeks
are between December 8 and May 5?” it seems likely that most
will compute the correct answer, and that any errors will have
no directional bias. A bias might be detected if respondents were
forced to quickly respond, but it would be unsatisfying to use such
a ﬁnding to explain the bias for deliberate judgments like those
made in our experiments.
9 There are good reasons for the two kinds of presentation that
have nothing to do with the date/delay effect. A Euro bill offering
is put on the market on one day, and matures on a speciﬁc day,
“buy now, pay later” schemes should be more attrac-
tive when described in delay terms (“pay nothing for
six months”) than when described using speciﬁc dates
(“pay nothing until June 2005”). An informal survey
of retailers in the UK making such offers found that
most do describe their offerings in this way (though
again we doubt this is strategic).
Governments could employ the date/delay effect to
convey the attractiveness of savings and the unattrac-
tiveness of debt. It may be more effective to advertise
savings by marketing it as “if you put £1,000 in a cash
ISA [Individual Savings Account] on the ﬁrst day of
2005, it will be worth £1,500 by Christmas 2015” than
by marketing it as “if you put £1,000 in a cash ISA
today, it will be worth £1,500 in less than 11 years.”
Likewise, to decrease consumers’ willingness to incur
debt, government regulation could require merchants
to specify in calendar terms the implications of loans,
as in “  on January 28, 2005, February 27, 2005,
and the last Friday of every month thereafter until
December 29, 2009, you must pay Johnson’s Electron-
ics £100.” Correspondingly, annuity products might
seem more attractive when payments are described as
being received on a speciﬁc date each year.
Conclusion
Politicians and poets know that the quality and inten-
sity of our responses to events is affected by how they
are described. It should not surprise us, therefore, that
the description of a temporal interval affects discount-
ing. Moreover, this ﬁnding is unlikely to be limited
to the contrast between date and delay descriptions
per se. For instance, dates that are “special” may be
treated differently than other dates, particularly if the
specialness is directly speciﬁed (e.g., “Christmas 2015”
or “on your next birthday”). Furthermore, there are
still other ways of referring to time and each may
be characterized by its own way of discounting the
future. One of us has noticed that our students seem
more panicked when told that they have 600 seconds
left to complete their exam than when they are told
they have 10 minutes left. Another of us, who is 37,
has noticed that an outcome occurring in 15 years feels
relatively imminent, whereas one occurring when he
is 50 feels like the far distant future. Thus, tempo-
ral events indexed by a person’s future age could
be discounted differently than those indexed in other
ways. Perhaps individual differences in discounting
can even be explained in part by the perspective that
and so it is natural—and legally required—to describe the offering
in terms of dates. On the other hand, consumer loans are ﬂexible
instruments that vary both in the time when they become avail-
able, and the repayment term. Thus, it is natural to describe their
temporal details in more abstract “delay” terms.
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individuals tend to spontaneously adopt when think-
ing of the future, when no speciﬁc perspective is delib-
erately cued.
As a ﬁnal note, our ﬁndings also serve as a cau-
tion to researchers. As discussed earlier, researchers
usually choose temporal descriptions for arbitrary or
pragmatic reasons. Yet they will then propose as gen-
eral truths ﬁndings that apply only to the particular
descriptions they arbitrarily or pragmatically chose—a
possibility highlighted by Experiment 5, which shows
hyperbolic discounting for one description but not the
other. Perhaps researchers should more seriously con-
sider the “operationalist” approach ﬁrst advocated by
Percy Bridgman in 1927 (almost 80 years ago):
If we have more than one set of operations [i.e., ways
of measuring a phenomenon], we have more than one
concept, and strictly there should be a separate name
to correspond to each different set of operations. (p. 10)
In intertemporal choice, as in any other area of judg-
ment and decision making, if different response modes
or superﬁcially different descriptions yield different
preferences (discount rates, risk preferences, attribute
weights, etc.), we should be careful to delineate
how broadly (or narrowly) a phenomenon applies—
whether it is universal or whether it applies only to
the speciﬁc set of descriptions or measurement opera-
tions we have chosen. Date discounting and delay dis-
counting are different concepts, and the implications
we draw from one kind of discounting do not neces-
sarily apply to the other.10
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